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POWER ENGINEERS SUPPORTING TRUTH
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(Original Blackout Questions as of August 2003) QUESTIONS NEEDING ANSWERS IN GOVERNMENT BLACKOUT REPORTS The following questions have been suggested in advance by participants in the Power Engineers Supporting Truth (PEST) group for use by its members in reviewing the official reports on the August. 14, 2003 blackout. Re: Overall System Conditions: What would have happened if the transmission ties to other regions had not opened? What actions did the security coordinators for the reliability councils involved take starting with the morning of August 14? Was there any evidence of sub-synchronous resonance? What was the loading and rating on the circuit that contacted a tree on August 14 and on the previous few days. Re: System Reactive Supply: What were the initial locations of low transmission voltages starting with the early morning of August 14? Had reviews been made of the "fixed tap" settings on step-up transformers in the various generating plants? Could changes in the fixed tap settings had increased the VAR supply needed at the various locations? Re: System Operation: Who had overall operational responsibility for maintaining secure/safe operation in the area where the blackout originated? What was the procedure for coordination of generator and transmission outages scheduled before the disturbances? Is there an agreed upon set of authorities that the person with operational
responsibility Had system studies been made of the affected area to establish transmission capacities (TTCs) recognizing the generation and transmission scheduled out of service before the initial disturbances? What was done to recalculate TTCs after the initial outages? Were voltage limitations considered: In the "base" TTCs? In the recalculated TTCs? Were there any instances when directions to adjust generation pattern/levels to reduce power flows were ignored or refused? If so, by whom? Summarize the performance of all EWGs in the affected area during the 10 hours before the cascading outage began vis a vis; responsiveness to operational directions for control of local voltage levels, for adjustment of transmission line loadings. When were the last system-wide simulations of stability and voltage
performance Where power lines tripped due to contact with trees, what were the ROW maintenance procedures in place for the affected companies? When last were the affected ROWS inspected/ maintained? Did the affected area have committees/individuals responsible for coordinating protective relays settings/philosophies between and among the various transmission line operators and all generating unit owners? Document the last review of relaying settings in the affected area. Re: Communications: Power line carrier communications were in use in some systems. Did the multiple transmission circuit outages that occurred, or overall system conditions, interrupt a sufficient number of these communication paths to cause a breakdown in communications. Did the increased problems of coordination between a much larger number of participants contribute to the blackout ? Re: Generation Adequacy: The NERC procedures for many years required analyses of the reliability of individual generator units and equipment for use in determining total system generating capacity requirements for the various regions. These were eliminated under pressure from some of the stakeholders involved who claimed that market forces would result in the provision of adequate generating capacity and a reliable system. Was the lack of generating capacity requirements (if true) a contributor to the blackout? Re: Transmission Reliability: What were the Transmission Transfer Capabilities (TTCs), and the Available Transfer Capacities (ATCs), on all Oasis Interfaces or Flowgates just prior to and immediately following each major transmission line outage on August 14, 2003? What were the corresponding power flows on each? Were TTCs from off-line, predictive studies available? Was there the capability in the control centers to calculate new TTCs on line? What attempts were made during the day to reduce Interface/Flowgate power flows? How successful was each attempt? What attempts were made during the day to reduce generation or modify commercial power transfer schedules? How successful was each attempt? What transmission operating criteria were in effect (loadings, voltages, stability, etc.)? Was the system being operated within the appropriate
ECAR (or other regional reliability council) criteria prior to each Re: Transmission Rights Both the investigations in California and the FERC investigations have shown substantial bidding irregularities in the obtaining of transmissions rights, with many companies concerned with how to increase profits rather than how to facilitate reliable operations. Did the procedures for buying, selling, and reserving transmission rights contribute to the blackout? Re: Reliability Risks vs. Transmission Constraints: Were the locations of economic transmission constraints the locations which caused the blackout or were other locations or conditions the key causes of the blackout? Past proposals by the Dept. of Energy and others is to add transmission to relieve economic constraints. There is some evidence, however, that the locations of economic constraints are not the ones at which we take the greatest reliability risks. Does the report determine, in the areas where transmission problems initiated, if the economic transmission constraints that existed or other conditions were the key factors in causing the blackout? Re: Future Transmission Systems Does the report examine our future transmission requirements, suggesting procedures for determining our best long range transmission alternatives for various market and competitive approaches and for various types of future energy sources including nuclear and coal units, dispersed generation, renewable resources such as windmills and photo voltaics, etc.?. Previous administrations have used "National Power Surveys" for such analyses. The first one was made in 1924 and they were repeated in the middle 1960's and 70's. None has been done since then. The intent of such power surveys is not to develop a blue print to be blindly followed but to establish the basic requirements for the future such as: major new inter-regional lines needed, transmission voltages to be used, etc. Does the report discuss the possibility of the splitting of our large synchronous networks into smaller networks tied together by DC. This could significantly reduce the area affected by a cascading outage while maintaining the potential for savings from interregional exchanges, reduce short circuit duties, reduce the control and relaying coordination problems, and allow each region to establish its own reliability standards and market designs. With a National Power Survey the specific transmission additions can be made competitively overtime in a coordinated manner. A most important and immediate benefit will be the determination in the difference in transmission costs for various technical and institution policies. Does the report recommend such an analysis before we proceed with spending $56 to $100 billion (as presently estimated) to reinforce our transmission systems? Does it propose that the costs for various alternatives be justified by the benefits of the procedures requiring them? Re: Market Forces Contribution: As a part of the blackout investigation will there be a thorough investigation of the operation of the power market, particularly the transmission rights obtained by the various parties before the cascading outage began and the power transfers that existed based on information from industry " tagging" procedures? This, and other data, will help establish the contribution of the operation of the power market transmission rights assignments, congestion information, etc. to the blackout. Has an investigation been made of the additional transmission required to facilitate the operation of market vs. what is required solely for reliability improvements? If transmission is required to facilitate market forces that would not otherwise be needed shouldn't the additional cost for this transmission be considered in evaluating the wisdom of the specific marketing procedures. Re: Competition Effects: What has been the impact about of competition on ancillary services? These are "necessary" services, essential for the system to operate reliably. Were these services provided since they are almost never are as profitable as providing electric energy. Did the generators have incentives to prefer power sales over these other services; especially reactive and spinning reserves? Has competition has impacted the availability of these services? Re: Restructuring Reliability Effects: Were the transmission operating procedures that existed before the restructuring of the industry compared with those resulting from the initiation of the revised marketing and operating procedures? Of particular importance is the answer to the question, "Would the old procedures used before the industry was restructured have possibly prevented the blackout? Re: Maintenance Expenditures Has an investigation be made of the effect of restructuring on transmission maintenance expenditures, personnel reductions, reductions in training etc.? Did these reductions contribute to the blackout or increase restoration times? Re: Restoration Procedures: What areas did not have restoration plans in place? When last were the plans reviewed/revised? Did all EWGs in the affected area participate in the development of the plans? What areas did not have black start capability? Did all generators (specifically their managers/operators) responsd quickly to directions re restoration? What coordination issues occurred during the restoration process? |
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