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POWER ENGINEERS SUPPORTING TRUTH
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PRESS RELEASE December 8, 2003 Experienced Engineers Criticize Government Blackout Report Jack Casazza IEEE Life Fellow, Educator, Former Utility Executive and Author (703 569 3579) Frank Delea Former Utility Executive and Author (770 645 4604) George Loehr N.Y. State Electric Reliability Council Executive Committee, Chairman Reliability Compliance Monitoring Subcommittee, Educator and Author (505 792 0643) Raymond Maliszewski IEEE Life Fellow, Former Utility Executive and Consultant (614 885 8683) Four nationally known engineers and former utility executives, having no political or commercial affiliations or financial support, have found the government blackout report omits many key factors in the cause of the August 14, 2003 blackout, making it difficult to separate facts from politics. Although based on data obtained by many competent engineers, the report is the sole responsibility of the Federal government. All participants involved in the investigation were required to sign confidentiality agreements that prevent them from discussing their findings or presenting contrary or differing views as to the reasons for the blackout. The report focuses on actions or inactions of the First Energy Company, the Midwest Idependent System Operator, mistakes by the system operators, and deficiencies in tree trimming. This new independent analysis has concluded the immediate key to the blackout was the failure of the First Energy EMS system and the lack of training of the operators to operate without this system when a series of electrical contingencies put the system in an unreliable state. The material presented in the initial Report is too narrowly focused to provide a basis for drawing conclusions, assigning blame or making policy recommendations. While listing the many increasing complexities and operating difficulties caused by government policy, particularly the huge increase in the number of participants involved in power system operations, it does not address how these factors not only increased the probability of the blackout but even made one probable. Making recommendations without further analysis would be a disservice to the general public. Of major concern is the failure to discuss the roles of NERC and FERC in the months leading up to the blackout and the many other conditions that contributed greatly to the blackout. Of specific concern is the report’s criticism of the operator performance and the control room facilities at First Energy without mention that NERC had approved the facilities, supervised the training of the operators and qualified them as system operators. It fails to mention that FERC had approved the establishment and initial operation of the MISO organization after certification by NERC and without verification to see if the necessary facilities, operating procedures and trained personnel were available in MISO for it to perform its role. Many other conditions that set the stage for and contributed to blackout were incorrectly dismissed as unimportant, including low system voltages, heavy flows through the region to Canada, and poor communications. There are also issues concerning the contribution to the blackout of certain electrical phenomena that are not reported or downplayed in the Report. Among these phenomena are the voltage and frequency transients starting in the morning of August 14, the increase in transmission line currents as a result of low system voltages, the impact of low voltages on the operation of the impedance relays that tripped many lines, and other technical concerns. Further, the Report completely fails to address the efficiency and adequacy of restoration procedures. Following most major blackouts, reviews have been conducted in order to learn how better to plan, operate and maintain the electric system. The August 14th blackout occurred at a time that the electric utility industry is undergoing its most massive restructuring in the last 75 years. It is doubly important that this post blackout review be broad in scope as well as in depth, and free of the influence of political or commercial interests. The report must result in corrective actions that consider all the contributing factors to insure that the evolving industry structure is capable of dealing with massive incidents that could result in blackouts if not recognized and responded to properly.
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